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IS LOCAL CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW A
BETTER REDISTRIBUTIVE MECHANISM
THAN THE TAX SYSTEM?
BRJAN GALLE*
INTRODUCTION
As Judge Calabresi has argued, preemption decisions are, at
their core, a choice about which tier of government should have
policy-making authority.1 In prior work, Mark Seidenfeld and I ar-
gued that the choice of whether or not to preempt state law deci-
sions should be based explicitly on "fiscal federalism"
considerations. 2 The economic discipline of fiscal federalism at-
tempts to measure the welfare effects of situating a given policy ei-
ther locally, nationally, or somewhere in between. 3
In order to decide whether to preempt state-level tort law or
other consumer safety regulation, policy makers must first deter-
mine the goals of the tort system and its alternatives. According to
one highly influential welfarist 4 account, while tort law may serve
* Visiting Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School
(2009-10); Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. My thanks
to the editors of the New York University Annual Survey of American Law, Catherine
Sharkey, and the other symposium participants.
1. See Hon. Guido Calabresi, Remarks at the New York University Annual Survey
of American Law Symposium: Tort Law in the Shadow of Agency Preemption, 65
ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 435, at 435 (2010).
2. Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DuKE L.J. 1933, 1997, 2003-04
(2008).
3. Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37J. ECON. LIT. 1120, 1121
(1999). Thus, our argument is that when courts attempt to decide whether a fed-
eral enactment preempts other government actors, one of the central considera-
tions should be whether restricting power to the federal government would in that
instance increase national welfare. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 2, at 1997. We
also argue that applying this standard to agency efforts to preempt would likely
lead to increased agency consideration of the fiscal federalism question, as well.
Id. at 2003-04. Although courts have long been thought to struggle with these
kinds of fact-intensive questions, we suggest that administrative involvement can go
a long way towards remedying that problem. Id. at 2004-05.
4. A welfarist is someone who believes that society should maximize overall
social utility, but that part of the relevant calculus should include consideration of
the public's preferences for the fair distribution of wealth or utility across the pop-
ulation. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L.
Riv. 961, 977-93 (2001).
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legitimate policy goals, such as promoting optimal deterrence, in-
suring accident victims, or even achieving corrective justice, it
should not be a tool for redistributing wealth. 5 Commentators
holding this view argue redistribution should occur solely through
the tax system because using tort law or any other set of legal rules
and regulations is inefficient.6 However, there has never been any
sustained consideration of whether redistribution through the tort
system could be carried out more efficiently at the local level.
My central argument is that redistributive tort rules can be
more efficient at the local level than the national level, and may be
more efficient than local or national redistributive taxation. As a
result, theory does not clearly predict whether society should prefer
local tort law over national or local taxation. Federal preemption
of local tort law therefore might well prevent society from using its
most efficient tool for redistributing wealth. Thus my argument im-
plies a need for further empirical work to determine whether fed-
eral preemption of local tort rules would reduce national welfare.
Tort law may be the superior alternative because, although it is
less efficient than tax at the national level, it may be the lesser of
evils at the local level. That is, while we would not choose local tort
regulation in a world with no economic distortions, tort law may be
the best available choice-the "second best"-in a world where the
market has other flaws. While redistributive tort laws have costs
that taxes do not, government cannot effectively satisfy a heteroge-
neous society's preferences for redistribution with a single national
set of tax rules. Local tort rules can better capture a wide variety of
preferences. It is unclear whether this gain is large enough to over-
come the additional losses accompanying the use of a tort system.
Of course, government can impose taxes locally as well. The
trouble is, at least under existing legal arrangements, local redistrib-
utive taxes create distortions and deadweight losses that local tort
laws do not. For example, firms cannot easily sell products in a
market without being exposed to its tort law, while current constitu-
tional restrictions on state taxing power make it easier for a firm to
gain the economic benefits of a market without being subject to its
taxes. As a result, sellers can easily avoid redistributive taxation, but
5. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 669 (1994) [hereinafter
Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient].
6. See, e.g., id.; David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute
Income?, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 439, 446-53 (2003); see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS
ULN, LAw AND ECONOMIcS 8-10, 111-13 (4th ed. 2003); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472, 1509-11 (2007).
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cannot escape redistributive tort law without surrendering the mar-
ket entirely. In jurisdictions where escaping redistribution is easy,
redistribution is difficult, and the accompanying economic costs are
correspondingly high.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I details the welfarist
argument against redistributive legal rules. Part II argues that both
national and local taxes are inefficient redistributive tools. Part III
explains that local consumer protection rules share some of these
inefficiencies while avoiding others, so it is ambiguous which
method is most efficient. Part IV considers the objection that tort
systems give rise to externalities, which may cause over-production
of redistribution.
I.
THE REDISTRIBUTION STORY SO FAR
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have put forth a number of
influential arguments against redistributive legal rules. 7 Kaplow
and Shavell are most interested in utility, but they concede that so-
cial preferences for how resources are distributed in society should
be considered in calculations of which rule best maximizes social
welfare.8 They argue, however, that achieving this distribution
should be the exclusive domain of the tax system because "using
legal rules to redistribute income distorts work incentives fully as
much as the income tax system.., and also creates inefficiencies in
the activities regulated by the legal rules."9
Consider the way in which taxation could affect work incen-
tives. Suppose, for example, that in deciding how many hours to
work Bruce will figure that for every hour he does not work, he can
stay home, garden, and watch Oprah. Each hour of leisure time
Bruce enjoys costs him the money he could have earned working. 10
The net opportunity cost to Bruce of each hour of leisure is the
salary he would have earned, less the costs of earning that salary,
such as commuting expenses and taxes. As taxes increase, leisure
becomes more attractive for Bruce, because the net opportunity
cost of leisure has shrunk."
7. See Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 5, at 669; Strahilevitz, supra
note 6, at 1509-11; Weisbach, supra note 6, at 446-53.
8. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 987-92.
9. Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 5, at 668.
10. RicHARD A. MUSGRAV & PEGGY B. MuscRAvE, PUBLiC FINANCE IN THEORY
AND PRACTnCE 299-301 (5th ed. 1989).
11. For example, if Bruce could earn $10 perhour, a 10% tax would mean
that the opportunity cost of leisure is $9. If taxes increase to 20%, the cost of an
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In essence, Kaplow and Shavell's first claim is that redistribu-
tive legal rules will affect Bruce's incentives in the same way as a
tax. 12 Suppose Bruce must make his decision to work or stay home
before he knows the liability costs he will incur as a result of work-
ing. Thus, he bases his decision on the ex ante expected cost of
working. If a legal rule on average redistributes money from Bruce
to others in the same amount as a 20% tax, then the ex ante ex-
pected cost to Bruce must be the same as under the tax. Some
people similarly situated to Bruce may face 40% costs; others will
face zero. But since the expected costs will be 20%, Bruce will as-
sume that is the cost of going to work.
Unlike a tax, however, the redistributive legal rule also changes
other kinds of behavior, producing the so-called "double distor-
tion" problem. Kaplow and Shavell use the example of a tort rule
aimed at reducing accidents. 13 An optimal non-redistributive rule
would maximize the tradeoff between accident prevention and the
cost of prevention.14 However, once the rule is altered to also redis-
tribute wealth, the behavior of actors changes, increasing or de-
creasing the number of accidents to a non-optimal level. 15
Taxation would not have this additional distortive effect, assuming
the rate did not vary depending on whether the taxpayer was in-
volved in an accident. 16 Thus, according to Kaplow and Shavell,
taxes should always redistribute more efficiently. 17
Using legal rules for redistribution may have other problems as
well. Redistributive legal rules often reach only those parties af-
fected by the legal rule, thereby making redistribution arbitrary and
perhaps deterring wealthier parties from engaging in the regulated
activity.' 8 Also, rules that operate on the assumption that one
party-every plaintiff or every defendant-is usually richer or
poorer than the other run some risk of distributing in the wrong
hour of leisure drops to $8. A complete account of Bruce's incentives would also
include the possibility that changes in his wealth would change his demand for
leisure, but for the sake of parsimony I set aside that situation here. MUSGRAVE &
MUSGRAVE, supra note 10, at 299 (distinguishing "income" from "substitution" ef-
fect of taxation).
12. Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 5, at 670-71.
13. Id. at 669-72.
14. Id. at 669.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 671-74.
17. Id. at 677.
18. Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARv.
L. REv. 1717, 1719-20 (1982); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 994.
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direction, while rules that are crafted to take account of each partic-
ular individual can be very costly.19
Critics have responded with a number of reasons to be skepti-
cal of reliance solely on redistributive taxation. Some detractors,
arguing from a welfarist perspective, claim that it is unlikely, or at
least not always the case, that workers take into account legal rules
to the same extent they do tax considerations. 20 Similarly, they ar-
gue that redistribution through taxation is politically more difficult
than through legal rules.21 Another welfare critique, suggested by
Chris Sanchirico and others, is based on a technical claim concern-
ing the way behavioral distortions affect social welfare.22 Because
the economic cost of a change in behavior-a "deadweight loss"-
rises exponentially with the size of the distortion causing it,23 it
should be more efficient to redistribute through many small rule
changes, rather than one large tax. Finally, non-welfarist argu-
ments present another potential defense of redistributive legal
rules. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, for example, argues that the re-
sults Kaplow and Shavell reach assume that society should maximize
a particular form of utility. 24
For my purposes here, I accept for the sake of argument that
Kaplow and Shavell's points are all well-taken. As I will explain, I
think that even on their own terms their claims have serious poten-
tial holes.
19. Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 5, at 675; Weisbach, supra note
6, at 449.
20. Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51
VAND. L. REv. 1653, 1657 (1998); Richard S. Markovits, Why Kaplow and Shavell's
"Double-Distortion Argument" Articles Are Wrong, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 511, 550-55
(2005); EdwardJ. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology of Redistribu-
tion, 52 UCLA L. REv. 1745, 1748-90 (2005). For a helpful survey of other
welfarist exceptions to the Kaplow & Shavell position, see Nicholas L. Georgako-
poulos, Solutions to the Intractability of Distributional Concerns, 33 RUTGERs L.J. 279,
304-17 (2002) (noting arguments for role of legal rules in deterring socially unde-
sirable behavior that is connected to wealth of actor; in targeting behavior that
reveals underlying characteristics of the actor; and in redistributing non-monetary
wealth).
21. Brett McDonnell, The Economists'New Arguments, 88 MINN. L. REv. 86, 111
(2003).
22. Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86
CORNELL L. REv. 1003, 1006-11 (2001). But see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax
in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 821 (2000) (discussing Sanchirico's
arguments).
23. Sanchirico, supra note 22, at 1006-11.
24. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution Through Private Law,
91 MINN. L. REV. 326 (2006).
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II.
INADEQUACY OF LOCAL TAXATION AS A
REDISTRIBUTIVE IMPLEMENT
Whatever the persuasiveness of the two sides in the redistribu-
tion debate, it should be noted that both have assumed a model
with only one government. I argue in this Part that redistributive
taxation in a federalist system with many competing governments is
fundamentally different than in the one-government model. To
some degree, this difference is because local taxes distort choices
about where to live or do business. Location-specific rents can miti-
gate some of these distortions. 25 But current tax law makes those
rents small, at least as to multistate firms. In contrast, Part III estab-
lishes that states may be able to extract large location-specific rents
through tort and contract law. Thus at the local level, redistributive
tort law may prove more efficient than redistributive taxation.
As Kaplow and Shavell acknowledge, one of their key assump-
tions is that there exists a tax system capable of providing the so-
cially-preferred degree of redistribution.2 6 They do not detail what
would remain of their argument if that assumption were false. In
all likelihood they would contend that, in the absence of full redis-
tribution through taxation, their argument would not collapse com-
pletely. Instead, the policy planner would be faced with
determining the second-best option.2 7 Given two imperfect op-
tions, the planner must ask which would result in the smaller loss of
social welfare: frustrating society's preference for optimal redistri-
bution, or distorting the economy to achieve optimal redistribution
through non-tax means?
It is a familiar point among federalism scholars that a single
government probably cannot fully satisfy its citizens' preferences for
redistribution or other public goods. 28 If the government sets one
uniform national policy for redistribution, then some voters will be
left who would prefer more redistribution and some who would
25. A locational rent is simply an opportunity for a taxing jurisdiction to cap-
ture some of the value it provides to private parties through tax. See Saul Levmore,
Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 571-72, 601
(1983).
26. See Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 5, at 675; see also Weisbach,
supra note 6, at 452.
27. On the theory of the second-best, see R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The
General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956). For a summary, see
Richard Markovits, Second-Best Theory and Law &Economics: An Introduction, 73 CHI.-
KENr L. REv. 3, 3-10 (1998).
28. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 10, at 451.
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prefer less. 29 In contrast, if redistribution policy can be set in
smaller governmental units, such as at the city or county level, then
each unit can offer a different level of redistribution, and citizens
can choose to live in the jurisdiction that matches their prefer-
ences, barring a number of other obstacles. 30 While the central
government might conduct this arrangement itself, there would be
informational challenges for the central coordinator as well as the
problem that the coordinator may not be perfectly politically re-
sponsive to the information it receives from each locality.3 1
This analysis implies that in order to show that redistribution
only through taxation is more efficient than the alternatives,
Kaplow and Shavell must defend their theory not only in a single
monolithic government, but also in a more complex federalist sys-
tem. Redistribution only at the national level would not fully satisfy
social preferences for distributive justice.32 Thus, they have two op-
tions. They can argue that local redistributive taxes are no more
distortive than local non-tax redistribution. Or they might pursue
the second-best argument, claiming that the welfare losses from lo-
cal non-tax redistribution would exceed any gains from more fully
satisfying the public's tastes. This latter line of argument will be
awfully hard to get a handle on, so for now let me focus on the first.
It is well established in the fiscal federalism literature that re-
distributive taxation in a multi-jurisdictional world is more distor-
tive than in a model with only one sovereign.33 If a government
extracts from residents or businesses more money than they are
willing to spend on public goods (including redistribution), they
may move to a rival jurisdiction with lower taxes. 34 This relocation
29. Id. at 455.
30. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1991); Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders'Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1498-99 (1987)
(reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)).
31. Mariano Tommasi & Frederico Weinschelbaum, Centralization vs. Decen-
tralization: A Principal-Agent Analysis, 9 J. PuB. ECON. THEORY 369, 378-80 (2007);
Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 53-63
(2004).
32. 1 assume here that individuals have a taste for redistribution that is tied in
part to their own personal participation in the act of giving, or to the benefit of
those who are geographically near or personally known to them, so that the incen-
tives of any one jurisdiction to free ride on the redistributive efforts of others
should be small.
33. Charles C. Brown & Wallace E. Oates, Assistance to the Poor in a Federal
System, 32J. PUB. ECON. 307, 328 (1987); Helen F. Ladd & Fred C. Doolittle, Which
Level of Government Should Assist the Poor?, 35 NAT'L TAXJ. 323, 328-32 (1982).
34. Mark V. Pauly, Income Redistribution as a Local Public Good, 2 J. PuB. ECON.
35, 35 (1973).
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results in deadweight loss: the firm has given up its most-preferred
location for the second most preferred, lowering its profit, while
this reduction in profit has not resulted in any additional tax reve-
nues for the government. 35 This is simply a contraction in the
economy, with no corresponding benefit for anyone.
Another familiar reason local redistribution is inefficient is be-
cause it can create a race to the bottom in the amount of redistribu-
tion. 36 When tax-paying firms or residents exit in response to
redistribution, every remaining taxpayer must pay more for the
same level of services. Moreover, redistribution may attract mi-
grants who would like to benefit from the more generous services,
also increasing costs for those who remain. Thus, localities may not
be able to offer the level of redistribution they would prefer for fear
of driving costs up while tax revenues plummet.3 7
These two lines of thought suggest that in a federalist system it
is more efficient to impose taxes on things that cannot move. 38 The
more mobile the tax base, the more difficult the redistribution.3 9
Additionally, the more firms respond to redistributive taxation in
their decisions on where to locate themselves, the greater the dead-
weight loss.
This is not to say that the only efficient taxes are those imposed
on land or things bolted to the ground. Firms and people may also
35. Id.
36. John Shannon, Federalism's "Invisible Regulator'--Interjurisdictional Competi-
tion, in COMPETITION AMONG THE STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND
EQUITy IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 117, 118-19 (Daphne A. Kenyon &John Kincaid
eds., 1991). But see Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking
the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1210, 1210, 1239-41 (1992) (challenging the accepted wisdom on the race to
the bottom).
37. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 10, at 455; Michael I. Luger, Federal
Tax Reform and the Interjurisdictional Mobility Impulse, 23 J. URB. ECON. 235, 236
(1988). Some commentators claim that this interjurisdictional competition is actu-
ally a race to the top, not the bottom. GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN,
THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYrICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 203-05
(1980); John Douglas Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 269,
296-98 (1999) (reviewing claims by others);Jeffery S. Zax, Is There a Leviathan in
Your Neighborhood, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 560, 560-67 (1989) (reviewing studies show-
ing competition between governments can reduce the size of the local public sec-
tor). These commentators argue that because of the disproportionate lobbying
power of interest groups, the limited time horizon of local officials, and similar
factors, redistribution will usually be greater than socially optimal. Competition
reduces redistribution back to (or below?) efficient levels. I take no position on
that debate here.
38. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 10, at 470-71.
39. Id. at 455, 470-71.
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be relatively immobile because there is inherent value in being in
their first-best location. 40 If so, the jurisdiction can likely extract a
tax equal to the costs of exit, including the decline in value from
the first-best to the second-best location.41 In these cases, the local-
ity can impose a tax without causing deadweight loss from reloca-
tion and can mitigate the extent to which the preferences of its
citizenry are frustrated. 42
A potential worry with location-specific rents is that they may
themselves cause inefficiencies by distorting the jurisdiction's politi-
cal processes. 43 If these rents are borne by outsiders, the proceeds
from them may look like free money to the voters in the jurisdic-
tion. Since the voters do not consider the burdens of the tax when
they set tax levels, they may demand too much redistribution rela-
tive to the socially optimal point.4 4 Tax-setting officials may be less
politically responsive to the needs of non-voting outsiders.45 While
outsiders can lobby or make campaign contributions, there could
be free rider and coordination problems among outside firms, and
one doing business in many jurisdictions may have trouble acting
effectively in all of them.46
40. See David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 ILL. L.
REV. (forthcoming).
41. See Levmore, supra note 25, at 571-72, 601-02; cf. Marcel Kahan & Ehud
Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205,
1217-32 (2001) (arguing that Delaware's corporate tax system is designed to ex-
tract from firms the added value of Delaware's legal system).
42. See Charles E. McClure, Jr., Legislative, Judicial, Soft Law, and Cooperative
Approaches to Harmonizing Corporate Income Taxes in the US and the EU, 14 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 377, 389 (2008); cf. MUSGRAVE & MuscRAvE, supra note 10, at 455 (noting
that redistribution may still be effective at the local level where "mobility is
checked by nonfiscal factors such as job location"); id. at 470 (arguing that sales
taxes may be employed with lesser distortion when the taxing jurisdiction is large
enough "to exclude avoidance by shopping abroad").
43. See Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation,
90 MICH. L. REv. 895, 927-28 (1992).
44. Id. Some scholars are dubious that this form of "tax exporting" can work
in practice. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Tax Exporting and the Commerce Clause, in
FiscAL FEDERALISM AND THE TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES 169, 170 (Charles E.
McLure, Jr. & Peter Mieszkowski eds., 1983). However, it may be that the percep-
tion that exporting works is itself sufficient to distort political outcomes, a point I
will return to in Part V.
45. For a more detailed discussion, see Brian Galle, Designing Interstate Institu-
tions, 40 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1381, 1398-1400 (2007).
46. See id. at 1400. Locational rents may have yet other costs, as well. For
example, as Roberta Romano explains, the fact that firms are aware of locational
rents may mean that, before a firm will commit to a start business in a state, the
state will have to credibly commit not to siphon off all of the firm's profits.
Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L.
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Perhaps as a result of these kinds of concerns, the law of state
and local taxation has evolved to minimize location-specific rents,
especially for firms doing business in more than one jurisdiction.
In other words, companies gain the financial rewards of doing busi-
ness more easily without bearing much tax for doing so. Constitu-
tional limits on states' power to tax, together with collective action
problems among them, combine to provide a variety of tax-mini-
mizing strategies.
The jurisprudence of the dormant Commerce Clause is re-
sponsible for one of the larger of these tax loopholes. 47 Sales taxes
are an obvious way for jurisdictions to capture some of the value
created by their efforts to establish a thriving economic commu-
nity.48 However, merchants can avoid sales taxes by selling from
outside the jurisdiction. For example: northern New Jersey malls
annually attract hordes of New York shoppers because of New
Jersey's lower sales taxes.49 To counter this problem, states have
created the "use tax," which is essentially a sales tax imposed on
goods bought outside the jurisdiction and then brought back to
it.5 ° In reality, though, the use tax is almost unenforceable unless
merchants collect it directly.5 1 States, however, have been barred
by the Supreme Court from compelling merchants to collect sales
or use taxes on the states' behalf unless the merchant has some
substantial "physical presence" in the jurisdiction other than the
use of a common carrier.52 Thus, mail-order and internet sales,
ECON. & ORG. 225, 235-36 (1985). Since talk is cheap, this "bond" will have to be
costly to the state. On the other hand, these bonding mechanisms oblige the state
to internalize some of the cost of the tax, diminishing the danger of tax exporting.
47. For extended discussion, see Galle, supra note 45, at 1390-92.
48. See Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and Consumption in the New
Economy: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 38 GA. L. REv. 1, 15 (2003).
49. For a review of the literature on the effects of political borders on sales
taxes and recent evidence at the international level, see Marcus Asplund et al.,
Demand and Distance: Evidence on Cross-Border Shopping, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 141 (2006).
The classic articles in this area in the U.S. context are Ronald C. Fisher, Local Sales
Taxes: Tax Rate Differentials, Sales Loss, and Revenue Estimation, 8 PUB. FIN. Q. 171,
173 (1980) (summarizing earlier studies of New York area) and John L. Mikesell,
Central Cities and Sales Tax Differential: The Border City Problem, 23 NAT'L TAX J. 206
(1970).
50. See Hellerstein, supra note 48, at 19-21.
51. John A. Swain, Cybertaxation and the Commerce Clause: Entity Isolation orAffili-
ate Nexus?, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 419, 428-29 (2002).
52. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313-18 (1992); see Charles E.
McClure, Jr., Sales and Use Taxes on Electronic Commerce: Economic, Administrative, and
Political Issues, 34 URB. LAw. 487, 493 (2002) (stating that the ability of out-of-state
sellers to escape sales tax is "more-or-less inevitable given the complexity of the
system and the constitutional prohibition against barriers to interstate trade").
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and northern NewJersey malls, all allow merchants to benefit from
a thriving market without charging any sales tax.53 Consequen-
tially, merchant behavior is highly sensitive to taxation: when a tax
is present, the merchants can alter their business behavior without
having to give up the opportunity to sell to customers in the taxing
jurisdiction. 54
State-level corporate taxes have similar problems. Firms can
shift taxable income from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdic-
tions easily.55 For instance, a firm can license its intellectual prop-
erty from a related entity in a low-tax jurisdiction, taking a
deduction for the cost of licensing in the high-tax state. 56 The Due
Process Clause limits states' power to tax transactions without any
"nexus" to the state, preventing a high-tax state from exacting any
revenue from the licensor.5 7 However, state supreme courts are
split over that issue, and other possible work-arounds exist.58 An-
other common tax-reduction technique is to arbitrage the different
state methods for "apportioning" corporate income. 59 Again, this
53. See Charles E. McClure, Jr., Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Economic Objec-
tives, Technological Constraints, and Tax Laws, 52 TAx L. REv. 269, 377 (1997); cf
Mitchell A. Kane, Risk and Redistribution in Open and Closed Economies, 92 VA. L. Riv.
867, 904-05 (2006) (explaining that one theory for imposing tax in jurisdiction
where sales occur is that it permits that jurisdiction to capture some of the "rents,"
or value, it provided to seller).
54. See McClure, supra note 53, at 377.
55. See MarkJ. Cowan & Clint Kakstys, A Green Mountain Miracle and the Garden
State Grab: Lessons from Vermont and NewJersey on State Corporate Tax Reform, 60 TAx
LAw. 351, 353-73 (2007); Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The Promise and
Pitfalls of Adopting Worldwide Formulary Apportionment, 61 TAx L. Rv. 169, 212-13
(2008).
56. See Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1993). That is,
suppose Firm A owns a toy store in South Hightax, which has a 10% corporate tax.
Firm A has $100 million in net profits for this year. To avoid paying $10 million in
tax, Firm A could enter into a licensing agreement with a sister corporation, A-Del,
owned by a common parent, A'. A-Del is incorporated in Delaware and pays a flat
$500 annual incorporation fee to Delaware regardless of revenues. A' assigns the
legal right to use the Firm A logo (say, a lovable giraffe) to A-Del. Firm A then
must contract with A-Del for the rights to use the logo. Because costs are ordina-
rily deductible from taxable income, Firm A reduces its net profits by the entire
amount of the license fee. It will be very difficult to identify a fair market value for
the license, so that Firm A can likely claim virtually any number and stand a rea-
sonable chance of prevailing against state challenge. Thus, Firm A pays A-Del $100
million, reducing its tax to zero, while A-Del continues to pay only $500 in tax.
Shareholders of A' are indifferent to the location of the $100 million, except to the
extent that they want to minimize their tax.
57. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-09, 313-18 (1992).
58. Roin, supra note 55, at 213-15.
59. Id. at 212-13.
Imaged with the Permission of NYU Annual Survey of American Law
2010]
536 NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 65:525
tactic rests on a federal constitutional rule: states may not impose a
tax on 100% of a multi-jurisdictional entity's income, but instead
must "fairly apportion" the piece of the firm's value attributable to
the contributions of the taxing state. 60 These formulae are highly
complex and can easily be gamed so the firm is taxed on much less
than 100% of its full value, or so most of the firm's income is appor-
tioned to low-tax jurisdictions. 61 States could probably solve both
the sales-tax and corporate-tax problems by effective interstate coor-
dination, but such efforts have routinely failed.62
One could argue that these problems can be overcome by a
system of federal subsidies. Indeed, several such subsidies are al-
ready in place. For example, federal taxpayers may take a deduc-
tion for many of the taxes they pay to their state and local
governments. 63 Many commentators, however, claim that the de-
duction and similar subsidies are unsatisfying solutions to the local
redistribution problem. 64 One difficulty they point to is that the
availability of the deduction creates a common-pool problem,
where each jurisdiction's taxes create a fiscal externality for the rest
of the nation, inducing each to outspend what its preferences
would have been absent the subsidy-in effect, an over-correc-
tion. 65 Further, federal support for local taxes may also weaken the
incentives of unhappy citizens to leave an underperforming juris-
diction, which is an important accountability mechanism for local
60. Joseph Bankman, State Tax Shelters and State Taxation of Capital, 26 VA. TAX
Rv. 769, 779 (2007); see Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate
Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAx L. Rv. 261, 319
(2001).
61. Roin, supra note 55, at 212-13. But cf Kane, supra note 53, at 924-26
(noting the possibility that apportionment could solve other problems with taxa-
tion of multi-jurisdictional enterprises).
62. See Galle, supra note 45, at 1394-1400, 1413-20.
63. 26 U.S.C. § 164 (2006); Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U.
L. REv. 875, 931-32 (2008); see Sam Bucovetsky & Michael Smart, The Efficiency
Consequences of Local Revenue Equalization: Tax Competition and Tax Distortions, 8 J.
PUB. ECON. THEORY 119, 120-22 (2006) (discussing how a system of federal reve-
nue-equalization grants can address the efficiency problems of decentralization).
64. Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes
Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REv. 413, 477-78, 484-90 (1996); Kirk J.
Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage
State and Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. Rv. 1389, 1425-30 (2004).
65. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAsURY, TAx REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 63, 78-81 (1984), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/
tax-policy/library/tax-reform/; Kaplow, supra note 64, at 489-90; Michael Smart,
Taxation and Deadweight Loss in a System of Intergovernmental Transfers, 31 CAN. J.
ECON. 189, 205 (1998).
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governments. 66 Economists have devoted considerable effort to de-
signing fiscal tools to overcome these problems, but so far there
seems to be no consensus that any of them succeed. 67
Thus, putting the local and federal systems together, American
tax rules by and large free many firm owners from location-specific
rents. 6 8 The implication is that redistribution through local taxes
will be relatively inefficient. Jurisdictions will struggle to achieve
their own citizens' preferences for redistribution, and, if they at-
tempt to do so, may damage the economy in the process.
III.
TORT AND CONTRACT AS LOCAL
REDISTRIBUTION?
My claims in Part II pose a problem for those urging redistribu-
tion only through taxation. The tax system cannot efficiently satisfy
society's preferences for redistribution because national redistribu-
tion cannot capture all preferences, and local redistribution is im-
practical and inefficient. The question then becomes one of the
second-best. Which system is more costly, a tax system flawed in the
way I have described, or redistribution through legal rules?
Kaplow and Shavell argue redistribution through legal rules
may encounter many of the same costs as a tax.69 Consider table
one, below. Kaplow and Shavell's analysis captures the comparison
between box one, national tax, and box three, national non-tax.
Redistribution through nationwide legal rules will likely fail to fully
capture public preferences for distributive fairness, just as national
taxation would. The more difficult comparisons are those between
box four, local non-tax, and boxes one and two, national and local
66. Brian Galle, A Republic of the Mind: Cognitive Biases, Fiscal Federalism, and
Section 164 of the Tax Code, 82 IND. L.J. 673, 696-700 (2007).
67. See Oates, supra note 3, at 1126-30.
68. It is true that redistributive taxes can also be exacted from other sources,
such as wealthy individuals who are not business investors. However, one can tell a
similar story about wealthy individuals, whose financial resources give them both
the opportunity to relocate and also the wherewithal to lobby on their own behalf.
Additionally, even if some redistributive taxes were collected from non-business-
related sources, an ideally designed redistributive tax would fall at least in part on
firm owners. Again, because deadweight losses grow exponentially in proportion
to the size of the tax distortion, redistributive taxes should be levied very broadly,
such that the marginal deadweight loss from each tax is equal. Sanchirico, supra
note 22, at 1006-11. That implies that a jurisdiction that could not readily tax
business-related sources would have to impose an inefficiently high tax on other
sources.
69. Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 5, at 667-68.
Imaged with the Permission of NYU Annual Survey of American Law
2010]
538 NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 65:525
tax, respectively. Does local non-tax redistribution create the same
deadweight loss and impracticability problems as local taxation? If
so, then at a minimum the choice between boxes two and four (ac-
cepting Kaplow and Shavell's other arguments) is straightforward:
box two is superior. However, I argue that the costs of shifting from
box three to four are smaller than the cost of shifting from one to
two: non-tax local redistribution has smaller deadweight losses than
local taxation.
TABLE 1: POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS OF REDISTRIBUTIVE MECHANISMS
REDISTRIBUTION NATIONAL LOCAL
TAX 1. National Tax 2. Local Tax
NON-TAx 3. National Non-Tax 4. Local Non-Tax
Local non-tax redistribution is more efficient than local taxa-
tion because it affords greater opportunities for location-specific
rents. That is, firms cannot easily reap the benefits of selling in a
particular market without being subject to the liability rules of that
jurisdiction. 70 As a constitutional matter, once a firm purposefully
avails itself of the opportunity for local sales, the jurisdiction has the
power to impose its rules on that firm.7 1 And most jurisdictions
allow plaintiffs to exercise this power to the fullest extent the Con-
stitution permits. 72
To be sure, in the case of defendants with a contractual rela-
tionship with prospective plaintiffs, defendants can attempt to spec-
ify a more favorable forum for disputes. Mandatory arbitration,
waivers of jury trials, and choice-of-law clauses designating a more
favorable jurisdiction's rules are all common tactics for mitigating
the costs of local consumer protection laws.7 3 The difficulty for the
firm, however, is that a given jurisdiction can simply refuse to give
effect to such terms. Courts have found such terms to be unen-
70. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42; see also Stephen F. Williams, Pre-
emption: First Principles, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 323, 327-28 (2009) (making this claim
about tort law).
71. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1067.1 (3d ed. 1998) (citing Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
72. Id. § 1068.
73. See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996
SuP. CT. REiv. 331, 355-61, 374-78; see also Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The
Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modem Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REiv. 373,
391-98 (2005).
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forceable for technical contractual reasons, such as the absence of a
genuine agreement, as well as on general public-policy grounds.7 4
Aside from the Federal Arbitration Act and some recently devel-
oped rules capping punitive damages, it seems few federal laws limit
non-discriminatory state or local rules mandating firms to be bound
by the jurisdiction's legal rules.75 Thus, a locality seeking to use its
tort or contract rules for redistribution probably can do so.
It might also be argued that redistributive legal rules cannot
actually work in practice, because the firm will simply include the
expected cost of the legal rule in the price of the product. This is
the classic "the landlord will raise the rent" problem much debated
in the redistribution literature. 76 Notably, whether redistribution
actually increases the welfare of beneficiaries depends in part on
the seller's ability to price discriminate. In order to "raise the rent,"
the merchant must know that a particular customer belongs to the
protected class and must be able to charge that customer a higher
price. If, in contrast, the merchant can charge only one price to all
of its customers, then there may still be redistribution.
It is true, however, that when the merchant "raises the rent" for
all its customers at once the resulting redistribution is from unpro-
tected to protected customers, rather than from the firm to poor
customers. In other words, rich customers unprotected by the re-
distributive legal rule pay more to cover the firm's cost of paying
out to protected poor customers. 77 But that is still a form of rich-to-
poor redistribution. Similarly, some redistribution is still possible
even if merchants can charge more from those protected by a legal
rule. Even when the merchant can identify protected class mem-
bers, the increased price typically represents an ex ante average ex-
pected cost. Thus, injured customers who win ajudgment obtain a
net gain, whereas uninjured customers pay more. In effect, the pol-
icy redistributes from lucky (uninjured) customers to the unlucky
(injured) customers. 7 This is essentially the identical structure as
74. See Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 695, 697-98 (noting reasons courts have refused to enforce arbitration agree-
ments); Gilles, supra note 73, at 399-408.
75. See Williams, supra note 70, at 328.
76. E.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor:
Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J.
1093, 1095 (1971); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract
and Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 604 (1982); see Weisbach, supra note 6, at 448-49.
77. See Weisbach, supra note 6, at 449.
78. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents:
Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1793-97 (1995).
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personal injury insurance: the customer transfers wealth from her
current rich and healthy state to a potential future injured state. 79
Thus, the "landlord-will-raise-the-rent" problem does not preclude
many forms of redistribution, including some that consumers rou-
tinely engage in every day.
As a result, whether redistributive taxes are superior to local
non-tax redistribution is theoretically indeterminate. We cannot
say confidently whether local taxation is superior to local non-tax
redistribution. Local non-tax redistribution may well pose the
double-distortion problem and other difficulties Kaplow and
Shavell point to.80 But local taxation creates deadweight losses and
losses from incomplete redistribution that local non-tax redistribu-
tion does not. Similarly, theory does not clearly tell us whether the
double-distortion costs are larger than the losses we would suffer
from setting only a single uniform national redistributive tax rule.
IV.
EXTERNALITIES AND THE INCIDENCE PROBLEM
One last set of potential arguments against redistribution
through local legal rules is worth independent consideration.
Professors Issacharoff and Sharkey have explained preemption as a
response to over-regulation by states; over-regulation results from
the fact that the costs of liability are putatively externalities for each
state. 81 The same point could be leveled against tort law as a tool of
redistribution; rather than capturing local preferences for redistri-
bution, it simply measures ajurisdiction's willingness to appropriate
the wealth of foreigners. In my view this danger is real, but some-
what overstated.
First, the costs of redistribution are not necessarily borne by
out-of-staters. When a firm is liable for a judgment, the economic
burden of that judgment is ultimately passed on to real people,
whether they are the firm's owners, its workers, its customers, or
even investors in other businesses. Tax scholars call this question of
which people bear the burden of an expense the "incidence" of the
cost.82 Typically, incidence depends on the elasticities of supply
and demand for the firm's products and inputs.83 For example, if
demand is highly inelastic, consumers pay virtually any price for the
79. Id. at 1794-96.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 7-19.
81. Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53
UCLA L. REv. 1353, 1368-71 (2006).
82. MuscRAVE & MuSGRAvE, supra note 10, at 236-39.
83. Id. at 250-62.
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firm's products. The incidence of a tax on such a firm is likely to be
borne by its customers because it can easily pass along the costs to
them without losing sales.84 Given the complexity of these relation-
ships, experts agree that measuring the true incidence of a tax on
corporations is a very challenging task.8 5
Thus, the true economic incidence of redistributive tort law
might not fall on investors in the liable firms. 86 If demand is rela-
tively inelastic the firm might charge a higher price for products it
sells in the high-cost jurisdiction. In that case the jurisdiction
largely internalizes the costs of any redistribution, since it is simply
moving money from some of its citizens (unprotected customers)
to others (the protected customers). Alternatively, the tax might
fall on investors or employees who reside in the taxing jurisdiction,
so that again costs are internalized.
In a recent essay, D.C. CircuitJudge Stephen Williams acknowl-
edged a version of this argument, but suggested that firms would be
unable to set prices to reflect the costs of a given jurisdiction.8 7
Judge Williams argues:
[I]n our federal system, given (1) the Supreme Court's rather
mild limits on in personam jurisdiction, (2) its almost com-
plete laissez faire as to state choice-of-law decisions, (3) the way
in which products and buyers wander among the states, and
(4) modern courts' virtually complete indifference to contract
provisions relating to liability, firms selling in interstate com-
merce cannot, as a practical matter, match selling prices to va-
rying levels of litigation risk. 8
In other words, firms cannot price their products according to
the legal rule of the consumer's jurisdiction because the consumer
can take the product elsewhere, and the seller will still be liable
under the rule of this third jurisdiction.
There is certainly some truth to these points, but it is rather
overbroad to claim that they apply to all products and all industries.
To take an extreme example, homebuilders and other construction
contractors probably do not need to worry much that their custom-
ers will take their product to a different state. More generally,
84. Id. at 254.
85. Id. at 264-69.
86. See Charles E. McClure, Jr., Incidence Analysis and the Supreme Court: An
Examination of Four Cases from the 1980 Term, 1 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 69, 82 (1982)
(arguing that incidence of state-level corporate taxes is unlikely to fall on investors,
because they can easily shift their investment to a firm that is not taxed).
87. Williams, supra note 70, at 327-28 (2009).
88. Id. at 328.
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prices should reflect average expected liability, and rational firms
ought to be able to predict where their customers will take their
products. Most claims will still be in the purchase jurisdiction and
many others will be in neighboring locales. It is plausible that firms
could price regionally, rather than state-by-state. Moreover, since
policies often spread regionally,89 a particular liability rule is rea-
sonably likely to hold in any one of the several neighboring jurisdic-
tions where consumers might take their products, further
facilitating regional pricing. Yet other services, such as insurance,
wireless, and satellite services, could simply add a surcharge (akin
to a "roaming" fee) for use in a risky jurisdiction for the seller.
Another internalization mechanism, suggested in recent work
by the corporate-law scholar Michal Barzuza, is through the corpo-
rate income tax.90 If a state imposes taxes based on firms' net prof-
its and the costs of liability are deductible by firms, then state
taxpayers in effect pay a portion of all judgments against the firm
through the reduction in revenue resulting from those deduc-
tions.9 1 In fact, most states have just such a set of corporate tax
rules.9 2 In those states, a portion of the costs of liability are spread
across all taxpayers, leading to at least partial internalization of the
jurisdiction's liability rule.
On the other hand, whatever the reality of the extent to which
the state internalizes the costs of liability, the state's voters could
still believe that those costs are externalities. 93 In that instance, we
might predict that officials will tend to over-produce redistribution
because they will not expect to be held accountable by voters for
the resulting costs. These officials take the risk, though, that their
political rivals will learn the truth and expose the hidden costs to
the public.94
Another complication raised by these kinds of political consid-
erations is the possibility that outside firms may exert considerable
political power despite lacking formal voting representation. This
89. Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy
Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 395, 399-400 (1990); see
FrederickJ. Boehmke & Richard Witmer, Disentangling Diffusion: The Effects of Social
Learning and Economic Competition on State Policy Innovation and Expansion, 57 POL.
RES. Q. 39, 40 (2004).
90. Michal Barzuza, Delaware's Compensation, 94 VA. L. REv. 521 (2008).
91. Cf id. at 535-37, 552, 556 (arguing that dependence of state revenues on
firm performance gives states incentive to design efficient rules governing firms).
92. JOHN C. HEALv & MICHAEL S. SCHADEWALD, 2009 MULTISTATE CORPORATE
TAx GUIDE 1-170 to 1-177 (2008).
93. See Shaviro, supra note 43, at 927-28, 957.
94. See Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 91-93 (2009).
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ground has already been thoroughly analyzed, not only in the pre-
emption literature but also in the related field of the dormant Com-
merce Clause.95 The only point to highlight here again is that
thorough analysis of the political economy of discrimination against
outsiders probably will be highly sensitive to the structure of the
industry and the nature of the liability;9 6 generalizations are
hazardous.
Overall, the externality problem does not conclusively resolve
the debate between taxation and non-tax redistribution. At times it
will probably be true that externalities will predictably lead to over-
production of redistribution. At other times externalities may be
negligible, or have little effect on the jurisdiction's political actors.
Thus, whether taxation is always a superior redistributive mecha-
nism is theoretically uncertain.
CONCLUSION
Current debates over preemption of local consumer protection
regimes have over-simplified their analysis by failing to consider the
possible use of legal rules as a tool for wealth redistribution. Possi-
bly this omission rests on the strength of a well-established welfarist
argument against redistributive legal rules. However, the argument
that legal rules are a poor choice of redistributive instrument ap-
pears not to have taken federalism considerations into account. I
have argued here that theory does not make strong predictions
about whether society should prefer taxation, whether at the na-
tional or local level, over localized redistribution through legal
rules. This finding, if it holds up, has implications not only for the
preemption debate but also more generally for the design of our
legal system.
95. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Eco-
nomic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L.
REV. 265, 271-73 (1990).
96. Probably the most forceful version of this claim is Ed Zelinsky's argument
that the political economy questions here are so difficult that the Court should just
give up. Edward A. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the Commerce Clause: The Case for
Abandoning the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 29
OHIo N.U. L. REv. 29, 32-79 (2002).
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